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[ am not  going to talk about  the whole  energy crisis, but view
it from the standpoint  of the Middle East.
Eric  Hobsbawn,  in  his  book  "The  Age  of  Revolution"  com-
ments  on  industrial  revolution  as  an  episode  without  a  beginning
and  without  an end.  Industrial  revolution  became  the  norm.  By
any reckoning,  this was probably  the most important event in world
history since the invention  of agriculture and development  of cities.
The industrial  revolution seems to have brought  about  a happy
paradox.  While population  increased  so did the general welfare and
standard of living.  An increase  in human numbers,  apparently,  did
not have the effect of creating material shortages.  Machinery  and
efficiency  have combined  to  create  a most  fantastic  result.  Tech-
nology  lies at man's  disposal with new forms  of energy,  electricity,
and  resources  never  before  available.  Free  of  the  need  to  devote
the bulk of its manpower to the primary production of food, the in-
dustrial West was  able  to diversify  its productive  capacity  and  the
remarkable  economic benefits of the industrial revolution have been
diffused widely among the people.
Industrial Revolution  Impact
Throughout  the  19th century  real wages  climbed  steadily,  and
by the end of the century  luxuries, such as meat and cheese, became
20th century staples.  The marriage  of science and technology to in-
dustry  and  agriculture  was  viewed  only  as  a  promise  of  future
wealth  and  not  a threat  of  eventual  environmental  deterioration.
Life not only has become easier but also prolonged.  The revolution-
ary  development  of  communication  and transportation  has  spread
popular  education,  and  the overall  economic  prosperity has  helped
enrich human experience.  Living for many of us has become some-
thing  more  than  a  mere  succession  of  events  between  birth  and
death.
The fact is, however, that western societies have increased their
standard of living not simply by their technological skills but also by
their access  to  the world's  natural  resources.  When  the rich  iron
ore of the Mesabi Range in Minnesota was exhausted the industrial-
ists could rely on new fields  in Ecuador.  The oilfields of Texas and
19Oklahoma  could  be  supplemented  by  those  in  Kuwait  and  Saudi
Arabia.
The Reality  of Change
By  the  end  of  World  War  II  an  important change  was  begin-
ning to take  form.  A revolution  of rising expectation  was starting
to grow among the "have"  nations.  A  common question among the
"have  not" nations was, "Why should we  refrain from building fac-
tories  and  super  highways?"  At  the  same  time  man was  rapidly
using  the earth's  natural  resources.  One  half of  all  the coal  ever
consumed  has been  burned  in the United  States since  1920.  Since
1940  Americans  have  used  nearly  one  half  of  all  the  oil  and  gas
ever consumed.  America,  with less than  6 per  cent  of the  world's
population,  in  1970  consumed  36 per cent  of  the fossil fuel,  20  per
cent of the cotton,  and  10 per cent of the world's food supply.
Too  much  of  the  world's  supply  of  energy  was  produced  and
consumed  in  those geographic  areas  where  the demographic  curve
had been completed.  In 1972 the United States was consuming one-
third of the globe's energy production.  At that time the energy  de-
mand  of the  United  States  was projected  to be more  than  doubled
by the year 2000.  The use of energy  in the United  States doubled
every 10 years although it took 33 years for its population  to double.
As  demand  was  increasing  supply  was  diminishing.  Distribution
problems  threatened  to curb this exponential  growth  abruptly.  As
former  Commerce  Secretary  Peter Peterson  explained,  "Popeye  is
running out of cheap spinach."
Clearly  the  stone  plaque  had  been  placed.  The fourth  Arab-
Israeli war of October  1973 was  a catalyst  which  made  the energy
crisis a fact of life for the industrial nations.  The war and Arab oil
boycott did  not  create  the crisis.  It hastened  its realization.  For
years,  forces  were  at  work  in  the  Middle  East  as  well  as  in  the
Western  World  which  would have  made and should have made  the
old pre-World  War II relationship between the oil-producing nations
and oil-consuming nations obsolete.  New developments were calling
for new sets of rules and new sets of priorities.  However, those few
in the industrial  world who saw the ominous signs could not awaken
the interests and  concern of the rest.
Germany,  Great  Britain, France,  Belgium,  and  Holland  all cre-
ated industrial  societies  predominantly  dependent  upon oil, a source
of  energy that had  to  be  imported  from  abroad.  It is  difficult to
conceive  how,  under  the  circumstances,  no  comprehensive  plans
were  drawn to deal with an energy crisis  if the flow of oil abruptly
came to an end.  Even the United States in its own great oil reserv-
20es could  not meet the challenge of ever increasing  demands for this
primary fuel.  According  to the United States geological  survey  in
1972,  only  52  billion  barrels  of  the  estimated  3  trillion  barrels  of
petroleum liquid in this country were identified and recovered.  Most
of the oil that was relatively easy to find had already been discover-
ed.  Oil  producers  were  forced  to  dig deeper  and  in  more  remote
areas  in the search for petroleum thus raising production costs. The
United States  in  1972  imported  nearly  28  per cent  of  its  oil.  De-
pendency  upon  imported  oil is  projected  to jump from  50 to  65 per
cent  by  1980.  While  only  10  per  cent  of the  oil  imported  by the
United  States  in  1972 came  from  the  Middle  East,  it  is projected
that the Middle  Eastern  Countries  would  supply  more than  60  per
cent of the total oil imported  by  1980.
Relationship  Alterations
Increased oil demand by  the industrial  powers, discovery of the
immense  oil  reserves  of the  Middle  East,  the  rising  national  con-
sciousness of people in developing nations,  and the emergence of the
well  educated  and competent  civil  servants  in  those  nations after
1950  radically  altered  the relationship  between  oil-producing  coun-
tries  and the foreign  oil companies.
There are other  elements that have  been  responsible  for what
has been happening  since October 1973.  In 1951,  Persia nationaliz-
ed the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company,  the first country in the Middle
East to do so.  The Persians had realized  that their non-renewable
natural resource was  being exploited,  not to their advantage  but to
the advantage  of foreign countries.  From  1911-1951,  according  to
the  published  statistics  of  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company,  the
British government received $700 million in taxes from Anglo-Iran-
ian Oil Company.  The company realized  a net profit of $615 million.
Iran's total share for those 40 years was $316 million.  In 1950, Iran
received $45 million in royalties, and the British government receiv-
ed $140 million in taxes.  This is why the Persians not only became
conscious of what was happening but were determined that it would
not go on.
The oil company  was  nationalized,  but as a result the country
was bankrupt because  the government and  the people  soon realized
that alone Persia could not compete with the international oil cartel.
When  the flow  of  oil from  Iran  stopped,  other companies  in other
parts  of  the  Middle  East  increased  oil  production.  For  the  two
years,  1951-1953,  when nobody was buying oil from Iran because of
a British threat, the oil production  of Quebec tripled.  Saudi Arabia
increased its oil production.  So by 1953, the Persians, much to their
own embarrassment, realized that they could not really work reason-
21ably with other nations  as long as they were by themselves.  From
this situation a new organization was created - the Organization  of
Petroleum Exporting  Countries  (OPEC).
The  Persians  had  defied  the  powerful  western  nations  and  a
powerful  oil  company,  and  it  seemed  that they  had  won.  Psycho-
logically,  the importance  of  the victory  cannot  ever be  overempha-
sized.  It was  heralded  by  Iran and  by  all  the developing  nations.
Egypt,  for  different  reasons  and  under  different  circumstances,
soon followed the precedent  by nationalizing  the Suez Canal.  Other
oil-producing  countries  followed the  example of  Iran in subsequent
decades.
The creation of OPEC came almost a decade after the nationali-
zation  of Iranian  oil.  Five nations  started it  in September  1961
Iran,  Iraq,  Kuwait,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  Venezuela.  By  1973,  eight
other  oil-producing  countries  had  joined.  In  1967,  the  Arabs  had
tried  to  use  oil  as  a  buffer  against  the  West  and  the  support  of
Americans for the state of Israel.  This  was  unsuccessful,  because
in 1967 there was not a great deal  of collaboration  among other oil-
producing  countries.  Also,  the Arabs  in the  south  did  not have  a
unified  policy to  follow,  and there  was  dissension  among the Arab
nations about a new policy.  The Arabs did  not have the money re-
serves needed to sustain a boycott of the oil-consuming nations.
In  1973,  the  situation  changed.  The  Arab  oil-producing  na-
tions managed  to formulate  a common  policy  and  gain the collabo-
ration of non-Arab  members of  OPEC.  In October  1973,  the Arab
oil-producing  nations  declared  they  would  not  increase  oil  produc-
tion.
Positive  Elements
There is  a positive  element in the energy crisis of the past few
years.  Some of the industrial nations have been forced to speed up
the research  and development  of alternative  kinds of energy.  The
United States and  Western  nations have  the potential  to overcome
the energy obstacles and to find new alternative  sources  of energy.
But for a short time, the world  must live with  the reality that the
OPEC nations have developed  a solidity in the use of oil power that
most industrial  nations  did  not think  was  possible.  They  will not
easily give it up.  It is madness even to comtemplate the use of mili-
tary force.
In the interim,  the advanced  nations face the necessity of find-
ing mutually satisfactory adjustments with this suddenly politically
and  economically  powerful  Middle  East.  These  adjustments  will
help  stabilize  the role  of  energy  in international  policy,  insure  the
22necessary  development  of  some of  the underdeveloped  nations,  and
obtain  the  necessities  upon  which  much  of  the  industrial  growth
depends.
Let  me  mention  two  or three  points  as far as  the  oil crisis  is
concerned  from  a  Middle  Eastern  perspective.  The  Arab  nations
know  oil  is  exhaustible.  In  1967,  oil in  Kuwait was  produced  at 5
per cent of the cost of oil produced  in the United States.  It was one-
eighth the price  of oil produced  in Venezuela.  This cheaper Middle
East oil was  the reason that Europe went to  oil as a main source of
energy  even  though  they have  plenty of  coal.  Middle  Eastern  na-
tions  soon realized  this and they became determined  not to continue
to supply oil at a bargain.
Another  point  concerns  Arab  leadership.  We  should  never
again  see  Arab  leaders  as  wild  bedouins  on  camels  looking  for  an
oasis.  They are well-educated,  competent civil servants.  Since 1950,
they have  been  the beneficiaries  of oil money.  They have been ed-
ucated at Harvard,  Cambridge,  and  Stanford.  Some of you probab-
ly have seen Mr. Zaki Yamini  on television,  the oil minister of Saudi
Arabia.  He doesn't look  like  a wild  camel driver.  He speaks  Eng-
lish with hardly  an accent.  Why  not?  He  has a law  degree  from
Harvard.  The Minister of Interior, Jamshid Amuzghar,  is  the rep-
resentative  of Persia in OPEC.  He  has a Ph.D. in economics  from
Cornell.  These  people,  as  I have  said, are competent.  They  know
their  strengths,  and  they  are  now  using  those  strengths  to  their
own advantage.
Finally,  much  criticism  has been  directed  against  the  oil-pro-
ducing countries for using oil as a political refuge.  This is not new.
All nations who have had the economic power have  used that power
for political purposes.  Has  the United  States ever  given economic
help  to the nations  with politics  it disapproved?  If such  initiative
is  taken  by  strong  nations  it  is  called  "statesmanship."  If  it  is
taken by a small nation it is called "blackmail."
The  Western  World  finally  realizes  the  need  for  cooperation
with the members of OPEC for mutual benefits, and I hope this will
be taking place.
On balance,  I  am optimistic.  I simply  cannot believe that the
world's  political  leaders  will be  so  stupid as  to turn their backs  on
the hard lesson  of  past hatred,  and  give  in again  to parochial,  de-
structive,  and  dangerous  national  demands.  They remember,  as do
you and I, that the pettiness  and jealousies  of  national sovereignty
blocked the global cooperation  that could have avoided World War I,
the Great Depression,  and with it, World War II.  I refuse to believe
the same tragic mistakes will be  made again.
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